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A  DECADE  OF  REVERSAL:  THE  NINTH  CIRCUIT’S
RECORD  IN  THE  SUPREME  COURT  THROUGH
OCTOBER  TERM  2010
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain*
Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today.
Reflecting on the beginning of another Supreme Court term
next month, I thought I would take the opportunity to reflect on how
cases from my own court have fared over the past decade.
I would like to start with a review of my court’s performance
before the Supreme Court from October term 2000 through October
term 2009.  I will then say a few words about the October term 2010.
I
The Ninth Circuit’s record, I am afraid to say, has been strikingly
poor.  From the 2000 term to the 2009 term, the Supreme Court ren-
dered full opinions on the merits in 182 cases from the Ninth Circuit.1
In 148 of those cases, the Supreme Court reversed or vacated our deci-
sion.2  In other words, our court got it wrong in eighty-one percent of
 2012 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; A.B., St. John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M.,
University of Virginia, 1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002.  The
views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my
colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  I would like
to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Kellen Dwyer, Fredrick Liu, and Kristen
Mann, my law clerks, and Steven Lindsay and Nathan Sramek, my externs, in helping
to prepare these remarks.  This lecture is largely based upon an essay published in the
Lewis & Clark Law Review. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth
Circuit’s Record in the Supreme Court Since October Term 2000, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1557 (2010).
1 See O’Scannlain, supra note *, at 1557.
2 Id. at 1557–58.
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its cases that the Supreme Court agreed to hear.  That’s a .190 batting
average.3
By contrast, in the past decade, the other twelve circuits had a
combined reversal rate of only seventy-one percent—ten percent
lower than that of the Ninth Circuit.4  Consider, as well, that over the
same period, the Supreme Court’s reversal rate of state-court deci-
sions was only about seventy-six percent.5  So, even the state courts, as
a whole, appear to be better at interpreting federal law than the Ninth
Circuit.6
Even more telling than the reversal rate itself, however, is the
number of unanimous reversals.  Seventy-two of the 148 Ninth Circuit
cases reversed during the last decade were at the hands of a unani-
mous Supreme Court.7  Put differently, in about one-half of all the
cases in which our court was reversed, not a single justice agreed with
the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  To quote Akhil Amar of Yale Law
School: “When you’re not picking up votes of anyone on the
[Supreme] Court, something is screwy.”8
To add insult to injury, our court was summarily reversed fifteen
times—that is, reversed by a short, unanimous opinion, without the
benefit of briefs on the merits or oral argument.9  Summary reversals
are, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “bitter medicine,” because
they are reserved for cases in which the lower court’s error is so
“apparent” that neither briefing nor argument is necessary.10  Unfor-
3 See id.
4 Id. at 1558.
5 Id.
6 I calculated the Supreme Court’s reversal rate of the other twelve circuits and
of state-court decisions based on the Harvard Law Review’s annual statistics for the
2000–2008 Terms.  See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—The Statistics, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 539, 546–47 tbl.II(D), (E) (2001), and my own data for the 2009 and 2010
Terms.  I should also mention that the overall reversal rate at the Supreme Court in
the last decade was around seventy-four percent.  This rate is skewed upward because
it includes the disproportionately high Ninth Circuit reversal rate.  Accordingly, I
have not highlighted this statistic, because it obscures the extent to which the Ninth
Circuit’s reversal rate is an outlier.
7 O’Scannlain, supra note *, at 1558.
8 Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Does the Supreme Court Hate the Ninth
Circuit? A Dialogue on Why That Appeals Court Fares So Poorly, FINDLAW (Apr. 19, 2002),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020419.html.
9 O’Scannlain, supra note *, at 1558.
10 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 268 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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tunately, approximately one in ten Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court results in a summary reversal.11
While about half of the cases reversing the Ninth Circuit were
decided by a unanimous court, a mere fourteen percent were decided
by a five-to-four vote along traditional “conservative-liberal” lines.12
Thus, though it is true that there have been five so-called “conserva-
tives” on the court over the past decade, the fact remains that in the
vast majority of cases, it is not just the conservatives who are voting
against the Ninth Circuit.  In the 2002 term, for example, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit eighteen times.  Justice
Breyer voted to reverse the Ninth Circuit eleven of those times.13
Given the number of unanimous reversals, as well as the general fre-
quency with which even so-called “liberal” justices vote to reverse, it is
safe to say that reversing the Ninth Circuit is much more than just a
matter of ideology.
It is also worth noting that Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s arrival at the
court in 2009 has not improved the Ninth Circuit’s success rate.  In
the 2009 term, the Supreme Court rendered full opinions on the mer-
its in fifteen cases from the Ninth Circuit.14  Eleven of the fifteen were
reversals, and five of the reversals were unanimous.15
Beyond reversal rates, another metric of a circuit’s performance
is the amount of times the Supreme Court grants certiorari in its
cases.  After all, because the Supreme Court often grants cert because
it senses a problem, a circuit that is doing well, arguably, receives rela-
tively few writs of certiorari.  Sadly, the Ninth Circuit does poorly in
this area as well.
In the past decade, about thirty percent of the Supreme Court’s
writs of certiorari to federal courts of appeals were issued to the Ninth
Circuit.16  Even though the Ninth is the largest circuit and decides
roughly one-fifth of the cases before the federal appellate courts,
thirty percent is still a disproportionately large share of cert grants.
11 In addition to the fifteen summary reversals by a unanimous Supreme Court
during the 2000–2009 Terms, there were three summary reversals by a non-unanimous
Court during the same period.  O’Scannlain, supra note *, at 1559 n.5.
12 Twenty-one of the Ninth Circuit’s 148 reversals were at the hands of a 5-4 vote
along traditional “conservative-liberal” lines. Id. at 1559 n.6.
13 Id. at 1559.
14 Id. at 1562.
15 Id.
16 See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE, no. 3, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 4.
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II
There is one area in which the Ninth Circuit’s record is especially
troubling: writ of habeas corpus cases.  It seems that at least once
every term, the Supreme Court has to remind us about the proper
standard of review in habeas proceedings under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (affectionately called “AEDPA”).17
For those unfamiliar with the statute, AEDPA prohibits federal
courts from granting habeas relief to state prisoners on constitutional
claims adjudicated in state court, unless the state-court decision “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,”18 or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”19  Review of state-
court decisions under AEDPA is thus highly deferential; for habeas
relief to be warranted, the state court decision “must be shown to be
not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.”20
This rule reflects the deference that federal courts owe to the
states as a matter of federalism.  It also reflects the fact that there are
simply too many state criminal convictions and not enough federal
judges for federal courts to give each state criminal defendant a full
rehearing under habeas corpus.
A
But, again and again, the Supreme Court is forced to remind us
of this rule.  For instance, recently, the Supreme Court determined
that “the Ninth Circuit did not observe [the] distinction”—between a
decision that is “unreasonable,” and a decision that is merely “incor-
rect.”21  Instead, the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit,
in granting a state criminal defendant a new trial, inappropriately
“substituted its own judgment for that of the state court.”22
In another instance, a case called Waddington v. Sarausad,23 the
Ninth Circuit took up the cause of a defendant who had been con-
victed of acting as the driver in a drive-by shooting outside a Seattle
17 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006)).
18 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
19 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
20 Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam).
21 Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam), rev’g 288 F.3d 1097
(9th Cir. 2002).
22 Id.
23 555 U.S. 179 (2009).
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school that arose from a gang dispute.24  A jury in a Washington state
court found the defendant guilty of second degree murder, but the
Ninth Circuit determined that the defendant deserved a new trial,
because one of the jury instructions at trial was too ambiguous.25  The
Supreme Court reversed, and criticized the Ninth Circuit for “dis-
sect[ing]” and “exaggerat[ing]” parts of the record to justify its rul-
ing.26  In short, the Supreme Court asserted that the Ninth Circuit
“failed to review the state courts’ [decisions through a] deferential
lens.”27
Or take Uttecht v. Brown.28  In that case, a jury in Washington State
found the defendant guilty of a horrendous murder and determined
unanimously that he should receive the death penalty.29  The Ninth
Circuit, however, overturned the sentence, because our court believed
that the Washington trial court improperly excluded a potential juror
who had expressed misgivings about the death penalty.30
The Supreme Court again reversed and held that the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not accord the Washington state court enough deference and
thereby “failed to respect the limited role” the federal courts should
play in reviewing state criminal convictions and sentences.31  This pas-
sage echoed the Supreme Court’s sentiments in a prior case which
also reversed the Ninth Circuit.  In that case, the court explained that
AEDPA “leaves primary responsibility with the state courts” for deter-
mining who has violated state laws and punishing the offenders and
“authorizes federal-court intervention only when a state-court decision
is objectively unreasonable.”32
B
So, why does the Supreme Court have such difficulty compelling
the Ninth Circuit to follow AEDPA?  The answer, in part, can be
gleaned from the Constitution itself.  Article III creates one “Supreme
Court” and leaves it to Congress whether to create other federal
courts, described as “inferior” to it.33  As Professor Henry Hart of
24 Id. at 181–82.
25 Id. at 182.
26 Id. at 195.
27 Id. at 194.
28 551 U.S. 1 (2007).
29 Id. at 4–5.
30 Id. at 5. See Brown v. Lambert, 451 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006).
31 Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 10.
32 Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 27 (2002) (per curiam), rev’g 288 F.3d
1097 (9th Cir. 2002).
33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Harvard Law School put it, this structure implies that one of the
Supreme Court’s “essential role[s]” is to maintain the uniformity of
federal law.34  But, as Professor Amar has noted, the Supreme Court is
“limited in [its] ability to discipline . . . lower court judges.”35
The Supreme Court does not enjoy control of the judiciary in the
way that the president controls the executive branch.  That is, the Jus-
tices cannot appoint, promote, or remove lower judges.  In that sense,
the Supreme Court is weak compared to the high courts in some
European systems where the judiciary is a kind of “self-sustaining civil
service bureaucracy.”36  Similarly, the Supreme Court cannot control
the judiciary in the way that a manager controls his employees.  It can-
not reduce salaries, incentivize through bonuses, or offer stock
options. Therefore, while the federal judiciary is arranged as a hierar-
chy, the Supreme Court lacks the motivational tools frequently
employed by other hierarchical superiors, so ensuring compliance by
lower courts in adhering to its doctrine proves relatively difficult.
Instead, the Supreme Court may only control the inferior courts
through reviewing their decisions on a case-by-case basis.37  To borrow
a phrase from economics and political science, the Supreme Court
and lower courts face a “principal-agent” dilemma, and the Supreme
Court’s primary tool in controlling lower courts is the reversal power.
The Supreme Court is well aware of this sanctioning mechanism.  In a
seminal piece describing the Court’s certiorari process, H.W. Perry
noted that Supreme Court clerks “frequently talked about the need to
‘slap the wrist’ of a judge below” through reversal.38
This institutional structure makes it difficult to compel obedience
to broad principles whose application is very fact-dependent, hence
the Supreme Court’s difficulty controlling the Ninth Circuit’s AEDPA
jurisprudence.  There is an enormous volume of habeas cases each
year.39  Indeed, in 2010, almost 20,000 habeas petitions were filed in
34 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953).
35 Amar & Amar, supra note 8, at 3.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 267 (1991).
39 During OT2009, federal district courts heard 20,564 federal habeas cases,
including capital and non-capital cases. See STATISTICS DIV., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 145 (2010).  During
that same period, federal circuit courts (excluding the Federal Circuit) heard 6512
federal habeas cases, including capital and non-capital cases. The circuit courts heard
a total of 43,737 cases during this time. Thus, the habeas cases accounted for seven-
teen percent of the docket. See id. at 123–24.
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federal court, and habeas cases constituted seventy percent of the
cases decided in the federal courts of appeals.40
Moreover, habeas petitions often turn on the particular facts of
the case.  For instance, habeas courts must often determine whether a
particular error was prejudicial or whether a particular decision of the
petitioner’s trial counsel was unreasonable.  For questions such as
these, there will almost never be Supreme Court authority that is
squarely on point.  Accordingly, despite all of its statements about the
importance of AEDPA deference, the Supreme Court is forced contin-
ually to exercise certiorari review in order to compel the Ninth Circuit
to apply those principles to individual cases.
III
In the most recent Supreme Court term, from October 2010 to
June 2011, our record has arguably gotten worse.  The Supreme Court
issued opinions in twenty-five cases from the Ninth Circuit, and has
reversed us in eighteen of those cases, twelve of which were unani-
mous.41  While our overall reversal rate in the 2010 term is nearly ten
percent below that of the previous decade, in context the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s performance remains underwhelming.  First, our seventy-two
percent reversal rate in the 2010 term far exceeded the sixty-four per-
cent reversal rate of the remaining circuit courts combined, closely
tracking the Ninth Circuit’s historical distance from other circuits’
reversal rates.42  Second, approximately one out of every two Ninth
Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court was reversed unani-
mously.43  This value is most significant in demonstrating just how dis-
tant the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning has diverged from that of all nine
justices on the Supreme Court.  In fact, fifteen percent of the
Supreme Court’s entire October term 2010 docket was composed of
unanimous reversals of the Ninth Circuit, a staggering number of
sanctions for our noncompliance.44
40 See id. at 145.
41 See Circuit Scorecard, SCTOUSBLOG (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazon
aws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/SB_circuit_scorecard_050311.pdf.  Note that
Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S.Ct. 2020 (2011),
is not included in my October term 2010 reversal rate of the Ninth Circuit, because
the case was mooted after the Ninth Circuit reached its judgment.
42 The Supreme Court issued decisions in forty-five cases reviewing circuit courts
(excluding the Ninth Circuit) during the 2010 term and reversed or vacated the cir-
cuit court decision in twenty-nine of those cases. See Circuit Scorecard, supra note 41.
43 See Voting Alignment—All Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.
s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_alignment_OT10_final.pdf.
44 For a convenient list of all OT2010 Supreme Court decisions noting how each
Justice voted, see id.
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I hate to sound like a broken record, but I would be remiss if I
did not point out that six of our eighteen reversals in the 2010 term
were in habeas cases, and five of those six were unanimous.45  It
appears that reminding the Ninth Circuit of its limited role in habeas
review has become a significant portion of the Supreme Court’s
docket.  And the Supreme Court does not seem too pleased to have to
play this role.  Indeed, the Court’s rhetoric toward the Ninth Circuit
has heated up.  For example, just this past spring the Supreme Court
called my court’s terse rejection of a state court factual finding “as
inexplicable as it is unexplained.”46
A
But two cases that the Supreme Court handed down in January
2011 are particularly notable.  The first is Swarthout v. Cooke.47  This
case ended our circuit’s brief experiment in acting as California’s
parole board of last resort.  In California, prisoners are entitled to
parole after serving their minimum sentences unless the board of
parole determines that “the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to society if released from prison.”48
California law provides prisoners with a right to a parole hearing;
various procedural guarantees and rights before, at, and after the
hearing; and a right to subsequent hearings at set intervals if the
board denies parole.49  California law also requires that the board’s
decisions be supported by “some evidence” that the prisoner poses an
unreasonable danger to the public.50  A prisoner who is denied parole
may challenge that decision in state court on the grounds that the
board’s decision was not supported by “some evidence” of future
dangerousness.51
In a series of 2010 cases, the Ninth Circuit determined that Cali-
fornia’s “some evidence” standard is incorporated into the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52  Thus, federal habeas
45 See OT10 Case List, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_caselist_OT10_final.pdf.
46 Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S.Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011).  In addition, the Supreme
Court went on to hold that there was “simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to reach
[its] conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner.” Id.
47 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011).
48 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(a) (2012).
49 See CAL. PENAL CODE, tit. 1, § 3041.5 (2012).
50 See id.; In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 201 (Cal. 2002).
51 See Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 210.
52 See Pirtle v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 611 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on
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courts in the Ninth Circuit began reviewing California parole deci-
sions for compliance with California’s “some evidence” requirement.53
Even apart from the Ninth Circuit’s dubious interpretation of the
due process clause, its decision to review the merits of parole applica-
tions raised a number of practical problems.  First, predicting whether
a prisoner is likely to be dangerous in the future is an extremely com-
plex task, and it seemed highly doubtful that we would be able to
develop judicially manageable standards for determining how much
evidence of future dangerousness constitutes “some evidence.”  Sec-
ond, in a circuit that is already overworked and understaffed, we were
inviting an enormous amount of new and difficult parole review cases.
For these reasons, among others, I joined a dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc written by Judge Sandra Ikuta, which
called the decision to review California parole determinations “one of
our oddest habeas decisions to date,” and asserted that “the Ninth
Circuit has not just misinterpreted the language of AEDPA, but has
actually rewritten it.”54
Well, I think you know where this is going.  The Supreme Court
summarily reversed us, and did so in colorful language, I might add.
The Court said that “[t]he short of the matter” is that reviewing Cali-
fornia parole decisions for compliance with California’s “some evi-
dence” standard “is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s business.”55  And
that was the end of that.
B
But perhaps the most significant habeas reversal of our court to
date came in Harrington v. Richter,56 also decided this previous Janu-
ary.  Joshua Richter was convicted of murder in California state
court.57  Richter brought a habeas petition claiming that his trial
parole,” which “encompasses the state-created requirement that a parole decision
must be supported by ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)); Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[C]ompliance with the [‘some evidence’] requirement is mandated by federal law,
specifically the Due Process Clause.”).
53 See Pearson, 606 F.3d at 609 (holding that “federal courts [must] examine the
reasonableness of [California courts’] application of the California ‘some evidence’
requirement, as well as the reasonableness of [those courts’] determination of the
facts in light of the evidence”).
54 Pearson v. Muntz, 625 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (internal citation omitted).
55 Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011).
56 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
57 Id. at 777.
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counsel was deficient in failing to consult blood evidence experts in
planning a trial strategy and in preparing to rebut expert evidence the
prosecution might—and later did—offer.58  Richter’s claim was
denied by the California states courts, a federal district court, and a
Ninth Circuit panel.59  A Ninth Circuit en banc panel, however,
granted Richter’s habeas petition.60
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  The Court began its
opinion by declaring that judicial “resources are diminished and miss-
pent, . . . and confidence in the writ [of habeas corpus] and the law it
vindicates [are] undermined, if there is judicial disregard for the
sound and established principles that inform its proper issuance. That
judicial disregard,” the Court continued, “is inherent in the opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here under review.”61
Then, after stressing AEDPA’s extremely deferential standard, the
court added, in an almost scolding tone, that “[i]t bears repeating
that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s con-
trary conclusion was unreasonable.  If this standard is difficult to
meet,” the Court explained, “that is because it was meant to be.”62
I think there are three points worth stressing about Richter.  The
first, and most obvious, is the harsh tone of the opinion.  The tone
could simply reflect the Court’s frustration with having to reiterate the
same AEDPA principles year after year only to have them ignored by
the same court of appeals, or perhaps, something more deliberate is
going on.  It could be that, recognizing that it cannot correct every
misuse of the writ, the Supreme Court has chosen to use a shaming
mechanism by which it picks the worst judicial offenders each year
and loudly points out their errors for the public to see.  Modern politi-
cal science research supports this general proposition: the Supreme
Court will frequently utilize its discretionary docket to strategically
audit cases from ideologically distant lower courts.63
Second, the Richter court focused directly on its difficulty in polic-
ing general standards such as the requirements to make out an inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim.  It attempted to solve this problem
by requiring “a specific legal rule” that has been “squarely established”
58 Id.
59 Id. at 782–83.
60 See id. at 776–77.
61 Id. at 780.
62 Id. at 786 (internal citations omitted).
63 See generally Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy:
An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
101 (2000) (delineating a study about how the Supreme Court uses its power of
review to sanction lower courts).
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by the Supreme Court in order to justify habeas relief.64  The Court
said that “evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable
requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule,
the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.”65  Moving to the case at hand, the Court found that,
while “in some cases counsel would be deemed ineffective for failing
to consult or rely on experts, but even that formulation is sufficiently
general that state courts would have wide latitude in applying it.”66
Third, and most importantly, the Richter Court traced AEDPA
deference back to first principles of habeas jurisprudence in a way
which, I think, went further than the Court has ever gone in this area.
The Court asserted that AEDPA “stops short of imposing a complete
bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state pro-
ceedings.”67  The Court stated that state court proceedings were “the
central process” for habeas review and portrayed AEDPA as a “modi-
fied res judicata rule” which bars federal court relitigation of habeas
claims unless there is “[an] extreme malfunction[ ] in the state crimi-
nal justice system[ ].”68
The implication of saying that Congress “stops short of imposing
a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected
in state proceedings,” I think, is that Congress could have gone fur-
ther and imposed a complete bar on federal court relitigation of
habeas claims.  This represents a fundamentally different view of the
necessary role of federal courts in vindicating the rights guaranteed by
the Suspension Clause than that adopted by some of the judges on my
court.
For instance, my colleague, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, recently
published an article in the UC Davis Law Review,69 in which he
describes AEDPA, correctly I might add, as forbidding federal courts
from overturning a state court habeas determination “unless the rul-
ing of the state court was not only wrong, but unreasonably so.”70  He
then asks, rhetorically, “Can this really be the law? Is AEDPA constitu-
tional?”71  The Supreme Court’s answer in Richter is a resounding
“yes.”  Judge Reinhardt appears to view the Suspension Clause as guar-
64 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 789.
67 Id. at 786.
68 Id.
69 Stephen Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our Constitution and How It Grows, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 391 (2010).
70 Id. at 408.
71 Id.
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anteeing every state prisoner a de novo review of his conviction in
federal court.  By contrast, Richter tells us that state courts are fully
capable of vindicating the right to habeas relief, and that Congress has
wide latitude in restricting the involvement of the federal courts in
this area.
IV
Given the Ninth Circuit’s apparent difficulty in following
Supreme Court precedent or properly interpreting many relatively
straight-forward questions of federal law, we now come to the ques-
tion, “What can be done about it?”  All circuit courts have internal
mechanisms in order to spot legal errors and correct them accord-
ingly, central of which is the rehearing en banc process.  My court will
entertain en banc proceedings in cases where review is either “neces-
sary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” or there
is a question of “exceptional importance.”72  While the en banc pro-
cess is helpful, it frequently fails to spot and to correct all of our cir-
cuit’s legal errors.  In fact, three of the Ninth Circuit cases reversed by
the Supreme Court in the 2010 term were decided by an en banc
court.73
While en banc courts are undoubtedly a useful tool in ensuring
doctrinal compliance with the Supreme Court and with our own cir-
cuit precedents, it is almost inevitable that the Supreme Court will
have to intervene to enforce its doctrine.  Empirical research has long
suggested that, in deciding which cases to take, the Supreme Court
relies on informal “cues” that lower information costs and winnow out
marginal cases from those that provide the best vehicles for doctrinal
enforcement.74  For example, an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor
General has a significant positive relationship to the eventual granting
of cert, even controlling for other variables, thus suggesting that the
Supreme Court pays close attention to such briefs.75
72 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1)-(2).
73 See RORY K. LITTLE & MICHAEL GAWLEY, ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S TERM, CRIMINAL CASES 40–46 (2011), available at http://www.uchastings.edu
/faculty-administration/faculty/little/2011-SupremeCourtSummariesFinal.pdf.
74 See Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue The-
ory, in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111, 111–32 (Glendon Schubert, ed., 1963).
75 See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988) (“While we have not
yet had the opportunity to analyze possible variations in the significance of briefs
from all of these different types of organizations, we have isolated one important set
of amicus briefs—those filed by the U.S. solicitor general.  Because of the prestige
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I propose that there is another mechanism available internally
within my court which can alert the Justices to Ninth Circuit error and
act as a stabilizing force for the rule of law: the dissent from order
denying rehearing en banc.  When my court fails to hear a case en
banc, a judge may write a dissent from that order denying the rehear-
ing.  The Ninth Circuit’s chief judge, Alex Kozinski, has labeled these
dissenting opinions as “dissentals.”76  Consider briefly this previous
Supreme Court term. Of the twelve unanimous reversals of the Ninth
Circuit, four of those came from cases that had elicited a dissental
from at least one of our members.77
Long-term tracking of dissental-writing within the Ninth Circuit
suggests that dissentals often garner the attention of the Supreme
Court.  In the past twenty-five years, all currently-active Ninth Circuit
Judges, in addition to now-Senior Judges Trott and Kleinfeld, have
written 220 combined dissentals.78  In the 152 cases in which at least
one Ninth Circuit judge wrote a dissental, the losing litigant peti-
tioned for cert at the Supreme Court.79  Of those 152 cert petitions,
sixty-five have resulted in a cert grant.80  Therefore, an astounding
42.8% of all cert petitions stemming from Ninth Circuit cases involv-
ing a written dissental are granted by the Supreme Court.81  As
recently as the 2008 term, only roughly 1.1% of all cert petitions were
granted by the Court.82  Relative to this baseline rate of cert grants, a
dissental by a Ninth Circuit judge increases a litigant’s chance of
receiving a cert grant by roughly 4200%.
Of course, it may often be that the significance or the incorrect-
ness of a case both attracts a dissental and a cert grant.  And it, admit-
tedly, is quite difficult to disentangle these variables, but a few more
statistics may be helpful in this regard.  In fifty cases heard by the
Supreme Court in which there was a Ninth Circuit dissental, the judg-
ment of a Ninth Circuit panel has been reversed in all but three cases,
far exceeding even the Ninth Circuit’s typically high reversal rate.83
Furthermore, sixty percent of those fifty cases were not only reversed,
and experience of the solicitor general’s office, its involvement often carries consider-
able influence in the Court’s certiorari decisions.”).
76 See In re Corrinet, 645 F.3d 1141, 1146 (2011)






82 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
83 O’Scannlain, supra note 77.
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but were reversed unanimously.84  To place that value somewhat in
perspective, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court
in only thirty-four percent of its cases this past term, excluding the
Ninth Circuit’s unanimous reversals in cases featuring a dissental.85
Because the Supreme Court’s treatment of Ninth Circuit cases involv-
ing a dissental appears to be qualitatively different from the other
cases on its docket, I am inclined to believe that efforts within the
Ninth Circuit to dissent from ill-founded denials of rehearing en banc
are not for naught.  While the burdens associated with undertaking a
dissental are not insignificant and some judges have alleged that they
are detrimental to collegiality on my court, the jurisprudential bene-
fits that come with them more than merit a continuing and vibrant
community of dissental writing on the Ninth Circuit.  Expanding that
community and coordinating dissental authorship to maximize their
necessitated output are the next best steps in preserving the rule of
law throughout the Ninth Circuit and correcting the legal errors that
have plagued my court in recent years.
V
In closing, I am reminded of a story I have heard about one trial
judge within our circuit.  The judge was eating lunch when her enthu-
siastic law clerk came running into her office.  “Congratulations, your
honor,” the law clerk exclaimed, “you have been affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit!”  The judge thought for a second, and then responded,
“Yeah, well, . . . I still think I’m right!”
I wish it were different, but the joke fairly reflects my court’s
unfortunate record before the Supreme Court.  Hopefully, we will
respond to the harsh words we received from the Supreme Court last
term and reduce our reversal rate in the years to come.
But only time will tell.
Thank you.
84 Id.
85 Id.
